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REFORMING THE PENTAGON:  REFLECTIONS ON HOW 
EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME 
EVERYTHING 
Mark Patrick Nevitt* 
ABSTRACT 
What best explains “How Everything Became War and the Military Became 
Everything?”— the provocative title of a recent book by Professor Rosa Brooks of 
Georgetown Law. In this Essay, I turn to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) 
unique agency design as the vehicle to address this question. Specifically, I first 
describe and analyze the role that the 1947 National Security Act and 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Act play in incentivizing organizational behavior within the 
DoD. These two Acts have broad implications for national security governance. 
Relatedly, I address the consequences of these two core national security laws, 
focusing on the rise of overseas combatant commands. Led by four-star military 
officers, these commands are increasingly participating in a wide variety of both 
military and non-military missions. Second, I turn to Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) as a case study to highlight the rise of these combatant commands.  
Special operations forces now operate in over 70% of the world’s nations, and this 
percentage is only rising. And since President Trump was elected, the Commander 
in Chief has delegated even broader authorities to operational military 
commanders. This serves to reaffirm Professor Brooks’s prescient themes of “war 
everywhere” while raising additional concerns regarding the underlying health of 
civil-military relations. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Professor Rosa Brooks’s recent book, How Everything Became War and the 
Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon,1 is a welcome literary 
contribution to national security scholarship and the increasingly important field of 
civil-military relations. She brings a unique perspective to this issue:  Already an 
accomplished legal academic, Professor Brooks also has professional experience 
serving as a special advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon 
(then Michèle Flournoy), as well as personal experience via her own service as a 
military spouse married to an Army Special Forces Officer.2 Professor Brooks’s 
keen observational eye, intellectual background, and her willingness to ask tough, 
thoughtful questions all combine to create an extremely important and provocative 
book. 
Indeed, controversial and difficult topics are not set aside. Professor Brooks 
addresses such weighty topics as how we go to war, how modern wars and 
conflicts end (if at all) what do we mean by “civilian control over the military,” 
and how might we go about reforming the United States Department of Defense 
(DoD) as an institution in light of the above?3 
In this brief Essay, I pick up where Brooks left off, focusing on her discussion 
on reforming DoD as an institution, which has continual implications for national 
security governance. This Essay was inspired, in some respects, by my personal 
experience as an officer in the Navy—the final two years of which were spent at 
the Pentagon where I had the opportunity to witness up close the vast military 
apparatus viewed with a mixture of skepticism and awe throughout Professor 
Brooks’s book. 
In this Essay, I first describe and analyze the two core laws that provide for 
the military’s legal organizational framework: the National Security Act of 1947 
and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Second, I highlight one example—the rise 
of special operations forces and covert action—where existing laws may be 
inadequate to restrain military action. This may, indeed, facilitate a world of “war 
everywhere”—a core theme of Professor Brooks’s book. 
 
 
This essay was first prepared for a book roundtable co-hosted by the Institute for International 
Law and Public Policy at Temple University Beasley School of Law and the National Constitution 
Center on September 15, 2017. The essays from this roundtable have been published as a 
symposium collection within issue 32.1 of the Temple International & Comparative Law Journal. 
* Sharswood Fellow & Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. A former 
Navy Commander, tactical jet aviator and attorney in the Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) 
Corps, he most recently served as the Deputy Director of Administrative Law for the Office of the 
Navy’s Judge Advocate General in the Pentagon. Special thanks to Professor Peter Spiro for the 
invitation to the forum and the Editors of the Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 
for their editorial assistance. All mistakes are my own. 
1. ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME 
EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON (2016). 
2. Id. at 5–6. 
3. See BROOKS, supra note 1. 
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II.  THE 1947 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND THE 1986 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS 
ACT:  ESTABLISHING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S LEGAL ARCHITECTURE 
What laws govern the DoD as a federal agency? It is an important question in 
light of the DoD’s sheer size and mission. The U.S. military has a history that 
predates the Constitution and remains the largest employer and bureaucracy in the 
world.4 The military also has a special place in the text of the Constitution with 
numerous military-related provisions sprinkled throughout.5 Perhaps most 
important, the DoD’s mission is unlike that of any other federal agency: “[Its] 
primary ‘output’ is lethal force, controlled in ways that compel people to do what 
they don’t want to do.”6 
The two laws that continue to have an outsized role in the DoD’s day-to-day 
activities include the National Security Act of 19477 and the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act of 1986 (“Goldwater-Nichols”).8 While the National Security Act is the 
subject of a fair amount of legal scholarship, Goldwater-Nichols’ role is largely 
unexplored. This is unfortunate and somewhat surprising in light of the law’s 
importance. Goldwater-Nichols established the modern military organization in 
use today and represents Congress’s latest attempt to comprehensively organize 
and define DoD’s myriad roles and responsibilities.9 As discussed below, these 
two laws governing the military have served the nation well, but they are 
beginning to show some fraying at the edges. As such, they should be given a 
“fresh look” by Congress and updated to reflect modern warfare realities. 
A.  The National Security Act of 1947:  Laying the Foundation for the Modern 
Pentagon Bureaucracy 
The National Security Act of 1947 fundamentally transformed U.S. national 
security governance. It established the modern national security processes as well 
as the organizational institutions to include the DoD, Central Intelligence Agency 
 
4. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 162 (“The Defense Department is the nation’s largest employer 
. . . there were roughly 1.4 million active duty military personnel along with 843,000 reservists [at 
the end of fiscal year 2013].”); see, e.g., Niall McCarthy, The World’s Biggest Employers, 
FORBES (June 23, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2015/06/23/the-worlds-
biggest-employers-infographic/#3ae7382c51d0. 
5. Specifically, Congress has the constitutional authority “to raise and support Armies,” “to 
provide and maintain a Navy,” and “to make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval Forces,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cls. 12–14, and the President is the Commander in 
Chief. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2. 
6. Forest L. Reinhardt & Michael W. Toffel, Managing Climate Change: Lessons from the 
U.S. Navy, HARV. BUS. REV. Jul/Aug 2017, https://hbr.org/2017/07/managing-climate-change. 
7. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (current version at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 3001 (2013)). 
8. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 992 
(current version at 10 U.S.C. App. § 111 (2017)). 
9. See generally KATHLEEN MCINNIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 44474 GOLDWATER-
NICHOLS AT 30: DEFENSE REFORM AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7–57 (2016). 
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(CIA), and National Security Council (NSC).10 Passed in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, it corresponded with the retention of a continual, standing 
Army for the first time in American history and the emergence of the Cold War 
with the Soviet Union.11 Specifically, it established the “National Military 
Establishment” with three co-equal services—Army, Navy, Air Force—reporting 
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Former Army General Omar Bradley 
described the significance of the National Security Act as follows: 
[The National Security Act] created what was called the National 
Military Establishment, with a Secretary of Defense presiding over three 
co-equal services: Army, Navy, and Air Force. . . . [T]he act established 
secretaries of the Army (instead of War), Navy and Air Force, and for 
the first time gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff legal standing. It also created 
the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA).12 
But despite the scope and overall ambition of the Act, many aspects were left 
unresolved, and continue to remain unresolved—themes that Brooks picks up in 
her book. Consider, for example, existing questions around the precise role of the 
NSC. The NSC was established by the National Security Act to serve as an advisor 
to the President, but it was placed outside the formal military chain of command.13 
It enjoys an enviable place at the very top of the national security pyramid, but the 
NSC staff lacks any direct authority over ongoing military operations. Its power 
(and access) is tremendous but inherently “soft.” It advises and makes 
recommendations to the President.14 It cannot direct operational military actions. A 
fundamental question arises: In the course of developing and executing plans, how 
should the NSC staff interact with Congress, DoD, and the operational 
commanders in the field? 
The National Security Act’s silence on this issue came to the fore in Brooks’s 
book when she was faced with this question: How should she respond if an NSC 
staff member bypasses any semblance of the chain of command when making a 
request? In her book, Brooks recalled a tale when an NSC staff member contacted 
her at the Pentagon and requested that she facilitate the movement of a drone to 
conduct surveillance operations in Kyrgyzstan within the Central Command Area 
of Operations (AOR).15 While the ends may have been justified, the means—
 
10. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. App. § 3021–3035 (2017). 
11. The role of standing armies was debated at the nation’s founding. In her book, Brooks 
makes the point about the size of the military and how standing armies—and military 
conscription—actually only occurred for a brief snapshot in American history, roughly between 
World War II and the end of the Vietnam War. See BROOKS, supra note 1, at 257–58. 
12. OMAR N. BRADLEY & CLAY BLAIR, A GENERAL’S LIFE 466 (1983). In 1949, two years 
after the National Security Act’s passage, the National Military Establishment was formally 
changed to the Department of Defense. Id. at 504. 
13. See generally 50 U.S.C. § 3021 (2017). 
14. See 50 U.S.C. § 3021(b)(1) (2017) (“[NSC’s duty is] to assess and appraise the 
objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States . . . in the interest of national security . . . 
for the purpose of making recommendations to the President . . . .”). 
15. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 307–09. The National Security Council’s Staff has exploded 
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bypassing the normal bureaucratic process and established chain of command—
were not. Brooks correctly demurred at the staff member’s awkward attempt at an 
order, explaining that “he . . . was the wrong civilian,” when the staff member 
invoked civilian control over the military in requesting that she take action.16 And 
this back and forth is not at all infrequent. In fact, former Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates expressed frustration about National Security Council staff members 
routinely calling operational commanders in the field.17 
B.  The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act:  Its Ongoing Legacy and the Rise of the 
Combatant Commands  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act is the second law having a continual and outsized 
influence on the modern military.18 Its passage followed a massive legislative 
effort that occurred over several years of intense debates within Congress and the 
Pentagon. It was passed in the aftermath of military tragedies that include the 
failed hostage rescue efforts in Iran and the poorly coordinated and executed 
“invasion” of Grenada.19 While it was passed with the noble goals of increasing 
military operational effectiveness, reducing inter-service rivalry, and reinforcing 
civilian control over the military,20 its legacy has been mixed and its influence 
immense. 
Unlike the National Security Act, which is located within Title 50 of U.S. 
Code and addresses myriad national security organizations and actors, Goldwater-
Nichols is a comparably “cleaner” Title 10 law that solely addresses Armed Forces 
matters. Today it serves as the critical component of DoD’s legal architecture, 
functioning as a sort of DoD “mini-Constitution.”  
Thirty years following its passage, Goldwater-Nichols continues to provide 
the organizational blueprint for the DoD, establishing and defining two legal 
chains of command: administrative and operational.21 It also clarified the legal 
relationships between the senior uniformed members such as the operational 
combatant commanders, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and senior civilian 
leadership—Secretaries of the Military Departments. In doing so, it altered the 
power balance, favoring the rapid—and lethal—response of joint warfare 
embedded with the operational and uniformed chain of command at the expense of 
 
in size since its inception and has lead to DoD-NSC coordination problems. Id.; see generally 
ROBERT GATES, DUTY: MEMOIRS OF A SECRETARY AT WAR (2014). Former Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates implies that DoD-NSC coordination can be problematic. Id. at 483. Central 
Command is the combatant command responsible for military operations in the Middle East and 
parts of Asia. 
16. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 309. 
17. See generally ROBERT GATES, supra note 15, at 482 (ordering direct phone line from 
NSS to operational command in center in Bagram Air Base removed). 
18. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 100 Stat. 992 (current 
version at 10 U.S.C. App. § 111 (2017)). 
19. See generally James R. Locher, III, Victory on the Potomac (2002). 
20. H.R. REP. NO. 99-824 at 1 (1986). 
21. 10 U.S.C. § 162 (b) (2017). 
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civilian leadership.22 
Throughout her book, Brooks highlighted the need to reinvigorate civilian 
control over the military.23 This begins, I believe, with addressing Goldwater-
Nichols’ consequences—unintended or otherwise. While it has been updated and 
provisions tweaked throughout the years, Goldwater-Nichols has not been 
substantively changed since its passage thirty years ago. But the world—and 
warfare—have changed dramatically since 1986.24 
Consider but one example. Under the Goldwater-Nichols scheme, a new 
combatant command with unique legal authorities was formed: Special Operations 
Command. Part III, infra, addresses the interplay between the National Security 
Act, Goldwater-Nichols Act, and this unique command. 
III.  THE MILITARY’S LEGAL ARCHITECTURE, COVERT ACTION, AND THE RISE 
OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
The National Security Act of 1947 addresses a broad range of security 
activities and authorities—which include not only DoD activities, but also CIA and 
intelligence activities.25 By placing different agencies with different authorities 
within the National Security Act, the seeds for future confusion may have been 
planted.26 Covert action, embedded within the Act, was later defined within the 
body of the National Security Act.27 Brooks highlighted the recent co-mingling of 
intelligence and military activities in her chapter titled “Secret Wars.”28 While care 
has historically been taken to differentiate CIA activities from DoD activities, this 
 
22. For instance, the Secretaries of Military Departments were placed outside the 
operational chain of command and were required to assign all of their forces to combatant 
commands. In turn, the combatant commands resided at the heart of the operational chain of 
command, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 10 U.S.C. § 162 (a)–(b) (2017) (addressing the assignment of forces and prescribing the 
chain of command). 
23. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 357–60. 
24. Consider, too, how much Congress has changed during that time. Military service in 
Congress rests at an all-time low—it was as high as 70% in the 1970s and now rests around 
20–25%. Abigail Geiger & John Gramlich, The Changing Face of Congress in 5 Charts, THE 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/02/the-
changing-face-of-congress-in-5-charts/. 
25. See generally Robert Chesney, Military Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the 
Title 10/Title 50 Divide, 14 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 539 (2012) (addressing the “armed forces” 
in Title 10); see also National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 3001 et seq. (2017)) (passed “[t]o promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of 
Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department of 
the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the 
National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government 
concerned with the national security.”). 
26. Id. 
27. See Intelligence Authorization Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3093 (1991) (defining “covert action”). 
28. See BROOKS, supra note 1, at 122–23 (referring to covert action’s modern usage as 
“semi-covert action” in her chapter on Secret Wars). 
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has become an increasingly difficult task29 due to the nature and complexity of 
modern threats, and how we respond to them. 
In 1991, Congress passed the Intelligence Authorization Act, which defined 
covert action activities. Placed within Title 50 and the National Security Act 
statutory scheme, “covert action” is defined as: 
[A]n activity or activities of the United States Government to influence 
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended 
that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or 
acknowledged publicly.30 
Under this definition, covert action is purposely broad in scope and care is 
taken to not limit what actions are precluded or otherwise limited by law. This 
definition also has a defining characteristic that is exceptional within American 
law: In order for an activity to qualify as a bona fide covert action, it must “not be 
apparent or acknowledged publicly” to the American people or the world.31 
So how does the law ensure accountability over these secret actions that are 
never to appear as or be acknowledged in public as related to United States action? 
Within the statute, a certain check on executive power does exist—a written legal 
finding and notification to Congress must accompany a “covert action”.32 Thus, a 
Presidential finding triggers a notification process to senior congressional leaders 
in the intelligence committees.33 
But covert action does not include traditional military activities (TMA), or 
activities that provide routine support to the overt activities of other U.S. 
government agencies abroad.34 One can see a certain appeal to the executive 
 
29. See id. at 122 (“In practice, military and CIA personnel generally work together quite 
closely when planning and engaging in drone strikes or raids . . . . But the increasing fuzziness of 
the line between the intelligence community and the military creates confusion and uncertainty.”). 
30. 50 U.S.C. § 3093 (emphasis added). Joint military doctrine does not use the term 
“covert action” in the context of special operations forces. It does, however, utilize the term 
“covert operation” defined as “an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the 
identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.” DEPT. OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY 
AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 55 (2016), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf. 
31. 50 U.S.C. § 3093 (emphasis added). 
32. Id. 
33. These senior congressional leaders make up the so-called “Gang of Eight.” Manu Raju 
& Tom LoBianco, FBI Director James Comey Meets with Congress ‘Gang of Eight’, CNN (Mar. 
10, 2017, 11:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/09/politics/fbi-director-james-comey-meets-
with-congress-gang-of-eight/index.html; see BROOKS, supra note 1, at 122 (“[A]ll activity 
designated as ‘covert’ requires a presidential finding and subsequent notification of the 
intelligence committee, even if just the so-called Gang of Eight: the Senate and House majority 
and minority leaders, and the chairs and ranking members of the House and Senate intelligence 
committees.”). 
34. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e) (2014). In his statement to Congress concerning the 1991 covert 
action statute, President Bush said in 1990: “I believe that the Act’s definition of ‘covert action’ 
is unnecessary. In determining whether particular military activities constitute covert actions, I 
shall continue to bear in mind the historic missions of the Armed Forces to protect the United 
States and its interests, influence foreign capabilities and intentions, and conduct activities 
preparatory to the execution of operations.” Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization 
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branch of using such exemptions. If a military action falls into one of covert 
action’s exemptions, it may never be reported to Congress—or anyone.35 If history 
is any guide, the executive branch will continue to seek operational latitude and 
independence without complying with broader oversight requirements if it doesn’t 
have to.36 Hence, there is a built-in statutory incentive for the executive to utilize 
the TMA and other exemptions, eliminating the legal need to notify both Congress 
and the American people of such an operation.37 Since the attacks of September 
11th, the TMA exception under covert action appears to have been widely invoked, 
although it is impossible to precisely know how many times this occurred (after all, 
secrecy is the name of the game).38 
Now enter special operational forces to the covert action mix. Today, special 
operations forces are the darling of the military, media and the executive branch. 
And they are operating almost everywhere throughout the world.39 In the face of 
new threats posed by transnational non-state actors, special operations forces now 
play an increasing role as part of the covert action congressional-executive 
notification dance. Congress has responded with increased funding and granting 
increased authorities to Special Operations Command, a transnational combatant 
command with worldwide reach and authorities. 
Brooks is rightly concerned about the change in the nature of these so-called 
“gray zone” conflicts that muddy the intelligence/military divide.40 Such activities 
include both special operations forces (military) and CIA personnel (civilian), 
 
Act, Fiscal Year 1991, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 14, 1991), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19899. 
35. See BROOKS, supra note 1, at 123 (“The CIA wants to keep journalists and the ACLU 
off its back; the military mostly just wants the intelligence committees to leave it alone.”). 
36. For example, consider the case study of the Iran-Contra affair. 
37. This exception is not defined in law. See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e)(2) (2014) (stating that 
“covert action” as defined in this statute does not include traditional military activities, nor does it 
include a definition of what constitutes traditional military activities). 
38. See BROOKS, supra note 1, at 122 (“[T]he Intelligence Authorization Act, which lays 
out most of the rules for covert activities, exempts ‘traditional military activities’ from its 
definition of covert action—though the definition and scope of ‘traditional military activities’ 
remains hotly contested.”). 
39. As of the time of this article, within the special operations community alone, there are 
special operations forces in over 137 countries of the world (70% of all nations). See, e.g., Nick 
Turse, American Special Ops Forces Have Deployed to 70 Percent of the World’s Countries in 
2017, THE NATION (June 26, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/american-special-ops-
forces-have-deployed-to-70-percent-of-the-worlds-countries-in-2017/. 
40. See Eric Gomez, Book Review, 37 CATO J. (2) 430–34 (2017) (reviewing ROSA 
BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING: TALES 
FROM THE PENTAGON (2016)) (“The key premise of How Everything Became War is that, in an 
age of non-state actors, new technology, and general interconnectedness, the distinction between 
war and peace has broken down. Instead of there being clear states of war and peace, the world is 
now faced with a continuum where most activities fall somewhere in between. Russia’s 
intervention in Ukraine, characterized by disinformation operations, ‘little green men’ in Crimea, 
and proxy forces, is an example of such ‘gray zone’ conflicts. Brooks argues that such conflicts 
are not a temporary aberration but a new paradigm that is already affecting the international legal 
system and the U.S. military.”). 
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further obscuring the lines between intelligence collection and kinetic operations. 
Special operations forces are everywhere, and Congress often does not know 
about where they are and the nature of their activities.41 The missions run from 
intelligence gathering to direct kinetic action.42 Special operations forces now 
operate pursuant to two distinct threads in the national security tapestry: Title 10 
activities, and activities pursuant to a covert action Title 50 TMA exemption.43 
Hence, the rise of what Brooks calls “semi-covert” action.44 
Questions arise: If an action is not clearly an intelligence or military activity 
(with many Special Operations Forces personnel not in military uniform), then 
what is the combatant status of the personnel engaging in covert action?45 Indeed, 
her book is more relevant than ever in light of the Trump administration’s recent 
announcements that they are considering the use of contractor forces as part of 
covert actions. How should military “covert” contractors be treated under 
international humanitarian law?46 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The success of Brooks’s book is encouraging. And the book is timelier than 
ever in light of President Trump’s election and the placement of active and retired 
 
41. During the recent military tragedy in Niger and Mali where four U.S. special forces 
personnel were killed, Senators Schumer (D-NY) and Graham (R-SC), both charged with military 
oversight, were unaware that the U.S. military was even present in that part of the world. Dionne 
Searcey & Eric Schmitt, In Niger, Where U.S. Troops Died, a Lawless and Shifting Landscape, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 2017, at A5 (quoting Senator Graham as stating, “[w]e don’t know exactly 
where we’re at in the world, militarily, and what we’re doing”). 
42. See, e.g., Nick Turse, Why are U.S. Special Operations Forces Deployed in Over 100 
Countries?, THE NATION (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-are-us-special-
operations-forces-deployed-over-100-countries/. 
43. Title 50 refers to a section of the U.S. Code that addresses the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s authorities to include other intelligence authorities. Title 10 is a section of U.S. Code 
that is devoted exclusively to the armed forces of the United States. See also Robert Chesney, 
supra note 25. 
44. See BROOKS, supra note 1, at 123 (“The end result is the same: when the covert goes 
semi-overt, and the overt goes semi-covert, the public is left in the dark.”); Rosa Brooks, By 
Other Means: Shadow Wars, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 20, 2012, 10:07 PM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/20/shadow-wars/ (“All covert activity requires a presidential 
finding and subsequent notification of the intelligence committee (even if just the Gang of 
Eight)—a fact that gives the Pentagon a strong incentive to insist that whatever it is that special 
operations forces are doing, it’s not covert activities.”). 
45. Some legal scholars have argued that the military members lose their protected 
combatant privilege and status under the Geneva Convention due to this co-mingled chain of 
command. To highlight one prominent example, the Osama bin Laden raid involved both military 
and CIA personnel. And there has been an increased interest in using contract personnel for such 
activities in the Trump administration. 
46. See Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing Covert Activities, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 521 
(2012) (describing the increased role that contractors have played in gathering intelligence, 
interrogating detainees, and engaging in hostile activities); see also Lindsay Windsor, Note: 
James Bond Inc.: Private Contractors and Covert Action, 101 GEO. L.J. 1427 (2012). 
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military members to senior civilian positions at the White House, DoD, and 
National Security Council.47 Further, President Trump has demonstrated a 
willingness to delegate more and more authority to operational military 
commanders.48 It is no exaggeration to state that President Trump “loves his 
generals.”49 
Since President Trump was elected, Brooks’s themes of “war everywhere” 
have, unfortunately, been reaffirmed. And the threat of conflict continues to be 
everywhere and has infiltrated our daily lives respective social media feeds—
Twitter50 is but one prominent example. Indeed. a sequel to Brooks’s book 
addressing “How Everything Truly Became War” in the Trump administration is 
waiting to be written. 
 
 
47. See, e.g., James Kitfield, Trump’s Generals are Trying to Save the World. Starting with 
the White House, POLITICO (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/04/donald-trump-generals-mattis-mcmaster-
kelly-flynn-215455 (discussing the circumstances of Trump appointees, and their military 
backgrounds, to positions of power in the executive branch). 
48. President Trump just recently released his 2017 National Security Strategy, reflecting a 
significant departure from earlier national security strategies adopted in the Obama 
Administration. See National Security Strategy of the United States of America, NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY ARCHIVE 29 (Dec. 2017), http://nssarchive.us/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/2017.pdf (“The United States must reverse recent decisions to reduce 
the size of the Joint Force and grow the force while modernizing and ensuring readiness.”); see 
also Christopher Fonzone, How Much Should Trump Delegate to His Generals?, NEWSWEEK 
(May 30, 2017, 11:54 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/how-much-should-trump-delegate-his-
generals-617643 (exploring the ways in which President Trump has shifted power over to the 
military). 
49. Consider the number of high-profile military and retired military officers within the 
Trump Cabinet. See Rob Garver, Trump’s Military Buildup Makes Even His Generals Nervous, 
THE FISCAL TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2017/02/28/Trump-s-Stake-
Military-Industrial-Complex-Makes-His-Generals-Nervous (“President Donald Trump loves his 
generals . . . . In the first weeks of his presidency, he has stocked the top ranks of his defense and 
national security team with them.”). 
50. See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (2 Jan. 2, 2018, 7:49 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/948355557022420992. 
